The Relationship of Selected Perceptual, Cognitive, and Personality Variables to Moral Judgment by Goldman, Simcha
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1977
The Relationship of Selected Perceptual, Cognitive,
and Personality Variables to Moral Judgment
Simcha Goldman
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1977 Simcha Goldman
Recommended Citation
Goldman, Simcha, "The Relationship of Selected Perceptual, Cognitive, and Personality Variables to Moral Judgment" (1977).
Dissertations. Paper 1749.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1749
r 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SELECTED PERCEPTUAL, 
COGNITIVE, AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES TO MORAL JUDGMENT 
by 
Simcha Goldman 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
August 
1977 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I gratefully acknowledge the services rendered by my Committee: 
Drs. James Johnson, Mark Mayzner, and John Shack. Particular thanks 
are due to Dr. Johnson who served as Director of the Committee. Dr. 
Frank Slaymaker was most helpful with the selection and interpretation 
of the appropriate statistics. 
ii 
VITA 
The author, Simcha Goldman, is the son of Rabbi Irving L. and 
Toby (Reichman) Goldman. He was born February 4, 1946, in New Orleans, 
Louisiana. 
His elementary education was obtained in the public schools of 
South Bend, Indiana. He attended junior high school at Arie Crown 
Hebrew Day School and senior high school at Ida Crown Jewish Academy, 
both of Chicago, Illinois. He was graduated with a High School Diploma 
in June, 1963. 
A Bachelor of Arts in English Literature was conferred upon him 
in September, 1967, by Yeshiva University, New York, New York. Upon 
graduation, he enrolled simultaneously at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanaan 
Theological Seminary and Bernard Revel Graduate School of Yeshiva 
University as well as City College of New York. In June, 1970, he was 
granted the degree of Master of Arts in English Literature from the City 
College of New York. The title of his thesis was "Prometheus Unbound 
Interpreted." In September, 1970, he was ordained as a Rabbi by the 
seminary and awarded concurrently a Master of Science, with a major in 
Jewish philosophy, by the Bernard Revel Graduate School. The author was 
admitted to the Graduate School of Loyola University in September, 1973. 
He received the degree of Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology in Jan-
uary, 1977. 
Upon ordination, Rabbi Goldman served from September, 1970, to 
August, 1972, as U.S. Navy Chaplain. He was assigned to Marine Corps 
iii 
Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina. Afterwards, he held a 
small pulpit in Mt. Clemens, Michigan, for one year. Rabbi Goldman 
took his clinical clerkship at the Loyola University Guidance Center 
and Day School. He divided his clinical internship between the Guidance 
Center and the North Chicago Veterans Administration Hospital. 
The author is married to Jeanne (Litvin) Goldman of Mt. Clemens, 
Michigan. They have two children. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
VITA 
LIST OF TABLES 
Chapter 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Instruments 
Procedure 
RESULTS 
DISCUSSION 
REFERENCES 
REFERENCE NOTES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
v 
Page 
ii 
iii 
vi 
1 
23 
23 
23 
31 
33 
48 
59 
61 
69 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
1. Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects Who are not 
Indiscriminately Pro-Religious (~ = 42) • 
2. Orthogonal Factor Matrix After Varimax Rotation . 
3. Analysis of Variance of Moral Reasoning by Cognitive 
Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Analysis of Variance of Moral Reasoning by Defense 
Mechanisms, with Selected Contrasts .. . . . . . . . . . . 
Page 
34 
35 
38 
39 
5. Analysis of Variance of Moral Decisions by Defense Mechanisms, 
with Selected Contrasts . . . . . . 40 
6. A 2 X 2 Analysis of Variance of Risk-Taking Preferences by 
Sex and Moral Decisions, with Unequal~ ..• 42 
7. Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Behavior Prediction 
Scale Scores by Sex and Moral Decisions . . . . . . . 43 
8. Univariate F Tests of the Sex Effect on Behavior Prediction 
Scale Scores 44 
9. Univariate F Tests of the Effect of Moral Decisions on 
Behavior Prediction Scale Scores 46 
10. Univariate F Tests of the Effect of the Sex-Moral Decision 
Interaction on Behavior Prediction Scale Scores • 47 
vi 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last 30 years cognitive developmental and social learning 
theories of human development have attempted to explain moral develop-
ment and ethical behavior. These theories, as exemplified by Kohlberg 
(1969) and Gewirtz (1969) respectively, differ, among other things, in 
their use of motivational constructs. Following the symbolic interac-
tionist school of social psychology, Kohlbert (1969) held that the 
individual's cognitive definition of a situation directly determined 
the moral emotion evoked by the situation. Cognition and affect were 
viewed as undergoing parallel development insofar as both are based on 
the intrinsic structural properties of human intellectual activity. 
Although "motives and affects are involved in moral development, the 
development of these motives is largely mediated by changes in thought 
patterns." (1969, p. 390) Gewirtz, on the other hand, argued against 
the use of motivational or drive concepts to explain social behavior, 
preferring more parsim~nious learning concepts such as response gener-
alization (1969, pp. 182-194). Other social learning theorists do make 
use of motivational concepts (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950; Sears, 
Maccoby, & Levin, 1951). 
In recent years there have been some attempts to integrate cognitive-
developmental and social learning theories of motivational development 
(Dienstbier, Hillman, Lehnoff, Hillman~ & Valkinaar, 1975; LaVoie, 1974; 
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Mischel & Mischel, 1976). Mischel and Mischel (1976) distinguished 
between the capacity to form mature moral judgments and the knowledge 
of moral standards, on the one hand, and the actual performance of 
ethical behavior. The former may depend on cognitive-developmental 
factors while the latter is influenced by motivational and performance 
factors specific to a given situation. Although Rokeach (1960) has a 
basically cognitive approach to personality and behavior, he makes a 
similar observation: II While a person's belief-disbelief system is 
a relatively enduring structure, the extent to which it influences be-
havior . • • is jointly influenced by situational conditions interacting 
with personality." (p. 402) 
Mischel and Mischel (1976) theorized that self-regulatory systems 
link judgments and behaviors. These systems include: 
(1) The rules that specify goals or performance standards in 
particular situations; 
(2) The consequences of achieving or failing to achieve those 
criteria; 
(3) The self-instructions and cognitive stimulus transformations 
required to achieve the self-control necessary for goal 
attainment; and 
(4) The organizing rules (plans) for the sequencing and termina-
tion of complex behavioral patterns in the absence of exter-
nal supports and in the presence of external hindrances (p. 94). 
Mischel and Mischel accounted for the low correlations of moral 
behavior across situations by man's ability to discriminate the different 
contingencies contained in the multitude of moral situations with which 
he must deal. Very specific expectancies tend to be developed which 
would result in highly varied response patterns. 
Dienstbier et al. (1975) used an emotion attribution approach to 
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explain resistance to temptation behavior. Negative emotional states 
such as anxiety, fear, guilt, and shame have a potentially important 
impact on moral behavioral choices. It was considered likely that such 
affects could be associated with specific behaviors through learning 
mechanisms. However, "these associations depend heavily on the causal 
attributions that are made about the source of the negative emotions 
during socialization experiences." (p. 300) Socialization techniques 
differ in that an internally-orienting process associates the child's 
emotional arousal to his own misconduct while an externally-orienting 
process associates the arousal to a fear of punishment. There was some 
empirical support for the hypothesis that external orientations are less 
effective in inhibiting violations in temptation situations with low 
risk of detection than are internal emotion attribution patterns. 
Dienstbier et al. theorized that attribution processes will in-
fluence how the individual will interpret his emotional arousal which 
will influence, in turn, his behavioral choices. They downplayed the 
importance of the symbolic interactionist approach, i.e., cognition will 
influence the perception of the situation and the nature of the conse-
quent emotional arousal experienced. 
Schwartz (1970) suggested that there are three basic elements 
which characterize all moral decisions: First, such decisions necessar-
ily imply significant consequences for other people. Second, the decis-
ion has an ethical quality only if the person making the decision is a 
responsible individual acting of his own free will. Third, the goodness 
or badness of the decision is evaluated in terms of the consequences it 
produces for other people. 
4 
In the same vein, it seems likely that the individual faced with 
making a moral decision, as characterized above, needs to evaluate the 
intentions of those people involved in the situation. Maselli and 
Altrocchi (1969) reviewed the development of attribution theory and re-
search in the area of attribution of intent. They found evidence of a 
\ 
strong relationship between attribution of intent and attribution of 
responsibility. They suggested that the characteristic manner in which 
the individual functions personally and interpersonally may be main-
tained, in part, by the attributions of intent which one makes. 
Rotter's Locus of Control (LOC) construct is believed to be a 
relevant variable bearing on individual differences in attribution of 
intent. The work of DeCharms, Carpenter, and Kuperman (1965) in this 
area is particularly significant in that it suggests that individuals 
with an internal LOC may also assume that other people can effectively 
implement their intentions. Externals, who characteristically feel that 
they cannot effectively influence what happens to them, may make similar 
assumptions about other people's attitudes. Maselli and Altrocchi con-
eluded that "the adaptive functions of attribution of intent include 
allowing the person to perceive the social world as more stable and pre-
dictable and aiding the person to make appropriate social responses." 
(1969, p. 452-453) 
Phares and Wilson (1972) investigated some of the issues raised 
by Maselli and Altrocchi. They had their subjects assess an individual's 
responsibility for traffic accidents under varying degrees of severity 
of outcome and ambiguity of responsibility. They found that subjects 
with an internal LOC do, in fact, attribute more responsibility to others 
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than do externals. 
Our discussion of the place of motivational constructs in theorie$ 
of moral development has led us to Rotter's LOC construct. This con-
struct (Rotter, 1966) and the theory upon which it is based (Rotter, 
1954) represent potentially valuable ideas in the ongoing efforts to 
develop a comprehensive and integrated explanation of moral development. 
The theory itself has been described as an attempt to integrate rein-
forcement theories with cognitive or field theories (Rotter, Chance, & 
Phares, 1972, p. 1). Rotter acknowledged the role that cognition plays 
in determining behavior: "The simple cognitions regarding the properties 
of objects determine, in part, expectancies for behavior-reinforcement 
sequences by defining the gradients along which generalizations take 
place." (Rotter et al., 1972, p. 337-338) Furthermore, both expectan-
cies and reinforcement values can be changed by cognitive processes 
(Rotter et al., 1972, p. 19). 
An empirical law of effect is the basic motivational concept in 
Rotter's theory. That is, any stimulus is said to have reinforcement 
value to the extent that it facilitates or inhibits behavior (Rotter 
et al., 1972, pp. 8-9). Phares' survey of the literature regarding the 
differential behavior of internally and externally controlled individuals 
in skill and chance situations led him to suggest that the LOC variable 
had a motivational aspect to it. That is, internals have a greater need 
to succeed in skill situations and externals have a greater need in chance 
situations (1976, p. 76). Similar suggestions about the motivational 
aspect of the LOC variable have been made (Rotter & Mulry, 1965; Midlar-
sky & Midlarsky, 1973). 
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Additional support for a motivational component in the LOC var-
iable is provided by Phares and Wilson (1971). They found that internal 
subjects were more attracted to an internal stranger than to an external 
stranger. Contrary to expectation, external subjects did not demonstrate 
greater attraction for external strangers than did internal subjects. 
Thus, the evidence is suggestive, but inconclusive. 
Although there are some theoretical bases for integrating cogni-
tive-developmental and social learning theories of moral development and 
ethical behavior, empirical research in the areas of moral judgment, LOC, 
moral behavior, and religious motivation presents conflicting evidence 
of the validity of attempting such an integration. This evidence has 
been reviewed in detail by Goldman (Note 1). What follows is a brief 
summary of this evidence. 
Rubin and Schneider (1973) found a significant positive correla-
tion between level of moral judgment and altruistic behavior while Mid-
larsky (1968) found a correlation of similar magnitude between an inter-
nal LOC and helping behavior. This implies that a positive relationship 
might exist between level of moral judgment and LOC. Bloomberg (1974) 
developed some evidence in support of this implication. However, Ar-
buthnot (1973) found a non-significant correlation between LOC and moral 
judgment. He concluded that moral judgment was a cognitive-developmental 
rather than a social learning phenomenon. 
Rettig and Rawson (1963) developed a Behavior Prediction Scale 
(BPS) based on Rotter's theory. The BPS requires the subject to predict 
whether or not the protagonist in a series of moral dilemmas will steal 
money. The expectancy of receiving a particular reinforcement and the 
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value of the reinforcement to the individual are postulated to be inde-
pendent constructs. The BPS measures, therefore, the expectancy of 
gain (Egn) to be obtained by stealing and its reinforcement value (RVgn) 
as well as the expectancy of censure (Ecs) and its reinforcement value 
(RVcs). According to Rettig and Rawson~s ethical risk hypothesis "un-
ethical behavior varies as a function of the perceived risk incurred by 
such conduct.'' (1963, p. 243) This study revealed that RVcs accounted 
for more of the variance in predictive judgments of unethical behavior 
than any other source, although all sources had significant effects. 
Responses to the BPS might be considered an indication of the 
subject's response if he were in the given situations. The RVcs factor 
has been shown to differentiate successfully between cheating and non-
cheating subjects in a one year follow-up study (Retting & Pasamanick, 
1964) and in another study of deceptive behavior (Rettig & Sinha, 1965). 
Cheaters predicted significantly more stealing would occur in the low 
RVcs condition than in the high RVcs condition as compared to non-cheat-
ers' prediction for the same circumstances. The investigators suggested 
that the honest subjects were not as sensitive as cheaters to conditions 
of low and high risk of censure because such considerations do not affect 
their behavior. The behavior of cheaters was apparently influenced by 
external circumstances. 
Although the BPS is constructed on Rotter's theory and has success-
fully differentiated between honest and dishonest subjects, Kraus and 
Blanchard (1970) found no significant correlation between Rotter's Locus 
of Control Scale and the BPS. 
Thus far we have reviewed studies dealing with three variables: 
8 
moral judgment, ethical behavior and LOC. A theoretical basis for 
attempting to integrate cognit~ve-developmental and social learning 
theories of moral development by Rotter's LOC construct has been out-
lined. However, the above studies, none of which included all three 
variables in the same investigation, yielded conflicting evidence about 
the empirical validity of such an integration. 
As noted above, cognitive-developmental and social learning 
theories differ in their use of motivational concepts. One motivational 
factor which might be presumed to have a bearing on the relationship 
between moral reasoning and conduct is religious motivation. Allport 
and Ross (1967) defined two different orientations to religion. Extrin-
sically motivated people tend "to use religion for their own ends . . • 
may find religion useful in a variety of ways--to provide security and 
solace, sociability. • . The embraced creed is lightly held or else se-
lectively shaped to fit more primary needs." (p. 434) People with an 
intrinsic orientation: 
••. find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong 
as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, 
and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the 
religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the 
individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. (p. 434) 
Hunt and King's (1971) review of the literature measuring intrin-
sic and extrinsic religious behavior led them to suggest that such re-
ligious orientations may, in fact, be a reflection of a basic personality 
variable. They had little doubt that religious behavior was influenced 
by the personality structure. In this, Rage (1972) and Dittes (1969) 
concurred. 
Although there would appear to be a logical relationship between 
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internal-external locus of control and intrinsic-extrinsic religious 
motivation (Strickland & Shaffer, 1971), Hunt and King's (1971) review 
of the intrinsic-extrinsic concept and Dittes' (1969) more comprehensive 
review of the psychology of religion made no mention of Rotter's social 
learning theory. The first empirical investigation, known to this 
author, of the relationship between religious motivation and LOC was 
that of Strickland and Shaffer (1971). They found a significant, posi-
tive correlation (r = .30) between the Religious Orientation Scale (All-
port & Ross, 1967) and the INternal-External Locus of Control Scale 
(Rotter, 1966). They concluded, therefrom, that persons for whom relig-
ious belief was an important part of their lifestyle and decision-making 
process tended to believe that they had a significant degree of control 
over their lives. People for whom religious behavior was a social tool 
with little significance for their daily lives, tended to feel that ex-
ternal forces had more influence in their lives. 
Goldman (Note 1) addressed the twin problems of the conflicting 
empirical evidence about the relationship of LOC to moral judgment and 
ethical behavior, as well as the limited evidence concerning the moti-
vational component of LOC. He administered a battery of 7 tests to 40 
subjects. This battery was comprised of the following: Three LOC tests 
including Rotter's, measures of moral judgment and intrinsic-extrinsic 
religious motivation, the Behavior Prediction Scale, and 2 measures 
a~sessing a person's interest in volunteer activities. The data was 
analyzed using factor analytic, multiple regression, and partial corre-
lation techniques. 
Goldman found that usage of post-conventional stages of moral 
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reasoning is positively associated with an internal LOC and pre-con-
ventional reasoning is positively associated with an external LOC. 
Secondly, intrinsic religious motivation and internal LOC were found to 
be positively correlated (r = .24, ~ <.07). This is a moderate corre-
lation and only approaches significance. 
Perhaps more important is the finding of the influence of indis-
criminate pro-religiosity on the relationship between LOC and the other 
cognitive and behavioral variables in the study. Allport and Ross (1967) 
suggested that indiscriminate pro-religiosity may be a form of undiffer-
entiated thinking. The indiscriminately pro-religious (INPR) subject 
tends to agree with anything that sounds favorable to religion. Thus, 
he endorses items on both the Intrinsic and Extrinsic subscales of the 
Religious Orientation Inventory (Allport & Ross, 1967). Consequently, 
given the scoring rules for the test, such subjects score higher on the 
Extrinsic subscale than on the Intrinsic. Allport and Ross classified 
as INPR any subject scoring 12 or more points higher on the Extrinsic 
subscale than on the Intrinsic subscale. 
Goldman found that almost invariably exclusion of the INPR sub-
jects from the statistical analyses strengthened the existing relation-
ships between LOC measures and the measures of moral judgment and 
ethical behavior. Partialling out the religious motivation variable 
from correlations of moral judgment and ethical behavior did not affect 
the relationship of the cognitive-behavioral elements to the same extent 
as did partialling out the LOC variable. Nevertheless, this finding is 
of particular interest, given the preceding discussion about attempts 
to integrate cognitive-developmental and social learning theories of 
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moral development. It suggests some support for the concept of a moti-
vational component in the LOC construct. It also suggests that a cog-
nitive style, as INPR was characterized by Allport and Ross (1967, p. 
441), influences the kinds of moral judgments a person makes. 
Finally, Goldman found that males and females differed in the 
actual decisions made on the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, Cooper, 
Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974). No significant differences were found 
between the level of moral judgment employed by the sexes. However, 
males as a group tended to endorse decisions involving violations of 
law while females tended to choose the alternative complying with es-
tablished laws. This finding raises the possibility that risk-taking 
preferences may influence the moral decisions one makes. 
The researcher's current objectives are several: First, to help 
clarify the cognitive and motivational aspects of LOC. Second, to 
explore various potential influences on the decision-making and behav-
ior-regulating processes associated with moral development. Finally, 
to determine if the previous findings of Goldman (Note 1) are replicable. 
Prior to reviewing literature relevant to the above objectives, 
an analysis of the task demands of the Defining Issues Test is in order. 
The standard instructions for the DIT require that the subject do three 
things. First, he reads a paragraph describing a moral dilemma and 
decides what the protagonist in the situation should do. Second, he 
then reads 12 statements dealing with different aspects or attitudes 
about the dilemma and ranks all of them on how important these aspects 
were for him in making his decision. These 12 items reflect different 
levels of moral reasoning. Finally, he selects the 4 statements most 
p 
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important to him and ranks them in serial order. In short, the sub-
ject is required to select 4 of 12 items based on their subjective 
importance and then rank order them. The resulting score is purported 
to be a measure of the subject's level of moral reasoning. 
Consideration of these instructions and the moral dilemmas con-
tained in the DIT suggests that the following factors may influence 
the subject's performance and resulting score: 
1. Ability to make cognitive discriminations. A subject's score 
is computed on the basis of which four of the 12 issue statements he 
selected as most important and the order in which he ranked them. Rest 
(1974) speculated on how the subject approaches the DIT. He character-
ized the subject's task as picking "the best way of thinking about the 
dilemma. The issue statements are small fragments of systems of think-
ing. If a subject has within his repertoire a certain system of think-
ing, chances are that he will recognize the fragment (the issue state-
ment)." (P. 6-2) It is possible, then, that DIT scores may reflect 
the subject's ability to discriminate relevant from irrelevant infor-
mation and utilize it properly independent of the ethical nature of the 
situation and information. 
2. Risk-Taking Preferences. In these dilemmas the protagonist 
must choose between two courses of action, each of which carries its 
own risk. In all of the dilemmas one of the behavioral choices involves 
violation of a law or a personal commitment. It seems possible, there-
fore, that the actual behavioral choices advocated as well as the as-
pects of the situation deemed most salient in arriving at those choices 
might be influenced by the subject's own risk-taking preferences. 
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3. Modes of Resolution of Inter- and Intra-personal Conflict. 
The DIT requires the subject to resolve a conflict entailing inter-
and/or intra-personal conflicts. It would seem likely, therefore, that 
the subject's attitudes towards personal responsibility for his behav-
ior as well as the psychological means by which he resolves the psycho-
logical conflicts associated with real-life situations would influence 
the subject's reasoning and choices on the test. Thus, perceptual, 
cognitive, and psychodynamic factors unrelated to moral judgment may 
contribute to the subject's score on the DIT. 
An extensive survey of the literature identified several variables 
which may influence moral judgment processes, particularly as measured 
by the DIT. Witkin's work in the area of field articulation would 
appear to have some bearing on the issue of perceptual and conceptual 
factors influencing DIT scores. The currently accepted interpretation 
of Witkin's criteria! measures of field dependence-independence is that 
these tasks measure the subject's ability to overcome spatial embedded-
ness (Kagan & Kogan, 1970). The investigation of the relationship 
between perceptual and intellectual functioning by Witkin, Dyk, Fater-
son, Goodenough, and Karp (1962) led Witkin to reformulate the field 
articulation construct as the perceptual factor in a broader cognitive 
style termed analytical and global functioning. Kagan and Kogan (1970) 
reviewed evidence which suggested that verbal tasks which require over-
coming an embedding context are not related to the analytical or global 
style of cognitive functioning measured by Witkin's criteria! measures. 
However, the evidence was obtained from tasks such as making new words 
from the letters of a given word. If there is some sort of embedding 
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context in the DIT, it is of a conceptual nature rather than a linguis-
tic nature. Witkin's field dependence-independence variable has been 
linked to wider dimensions of human functioning--cognition, intelligence, 
personality, and social behavior (Kagan & Kogan, 1970). Inasmuch as 
Witkin et al. (1962, p. 80) suggested that the analytical or global 
dimension of functioning is reflected not only in perceptual function-
ing, but also in problem-solving activities, the variable remains a 
relevant one for exploring the nature of the DIT task demands. 
There is a great deal of evidence that an individual's cognitive 
style influences interpersonal functioning. Mayo and Crockett (1964) 
found that a person's cognitive complexity influenced his utilization 
of information about people in forming impressions of them. Harvey 
and Ware (1967) obtained similar results, working within the concrete-
ness-abstractness construct of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961). This 
construct reflects individual differences in the way people differen-
tiate and organize conceptual aspects of their experiences. Harvey and 
Ware (1967) found that people with concrete conceptual functioning 
resolved cognitive inconsistencies much differently than those who func-
tioned more abstractly. Halverson (1970) similarly found that concrete 
subjects were able to tolerate less inconsistency in their impressions 
of other people than abstractly-functioning subjects. 
As noted above, Goldman (Note 1) found that an undifferentiated 
cognitive style influenced the relationship between LOC measures and 
the DIT. Phares and Davis (1966) found that broad categorizers, as 
measured by the Pettigrew Category Width Scale, showed significantly 
greater generalization of expectancies for success between two 
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experimental tasks than did narrow categorizers. One significant 
aspect of their findings is the theoretical implication that a measure 
of cognitive functioning may influence expectancy phenomena and, by 
further implication, the behavioral choices ensuing. Together with the 
findings in the field of cognitive complexity and problem solving, 
these studies support the relevance of assessing an individual's cog-
nitive style when investigatingmoraljudgments about social situations. 
Rimoldi and his associates have done a great deal of work explor-
ing the relationships between logical structure, language, and thinking 
(e.g., Rimoldi, Fogliatto, Haley, Reyes, Erdmann, & Zacharia, Note 2; 
Rimoldi, Fogliatto, Erdmann, & Donnelly, Note 3). A method was devised 
to study thought processes, used by a subject in solving a problem, 
based on analysis of the questions asked by the subject in reaching a 
solution. The basic unit of analysis was the sequence of questions 
selected, this sequence being termed a tactic. Some of the basic 
assumptions of this approach are these: " a) that subjects are assumed 
to actively search for and combine information that they consider neces-
sary and sufficient to reach a solution, b) that tactics are an index 
of the subject's thinking process ... d) that individual differences are 
more likely to be highlighted through the study of the tactics than 
through the study of the final answers ..•. " (Rimoldi, Note 4, p. 3) 
The Rimoldi problems are constructed in such a way that the ideal 
method of solving the problem is "theoretically defined, results from a 
logical analysis of the problem, and can be obtained prior to any exper-
imentation." (Rimoldi, Note 4, p. 9) The intrinsic difficulty of each 
problem is reflected in its ideal tactic(s). A scoring method was 
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devised by which subjects' scores will be higher to the extent that the 
manner in which they solved the problem approximated the ideal tactic. 
Subjects' scores are lower to the extent that their tactic was irrele-
vant or redundant (Erdmann, Note 5). 
The relevance of Rimoldi's work to the moral decision making 
process is contained in Rest's suggestion that the DIT may very well 
require the subject to select "the best way of thinking about the di-
lemma," (Rest, 1974) as well as identification of a particular system 
of thinking from a fragment of that system. Subjects who perform well 
on the Rimoldi problems are those who can identify the logical struc-
ture of the problem and match the given questions to the particular 
elements of that structure. Furthermore, performance on the Rimoldi 
problems has been linked to Rokeach's open- and closed-minded dimension. 
Robb (Note 6) found that open-minded subjects, as measured by Rokeach's 
Dogmatism Scale, were better than closed-minded subjects in recognizing 
and using the logical structure of the Rimoldi problems. He also found 
that closed-minded subjects performed better on questions with concrete 
content rather than abstract content, while open-minded subjects did 
not differ in their performance on these two types of content. This 
is another example in the literature of particular cognitive styles 
being associated with other measures of cognitive functioning. Similar-
ly, dogmatism has been found by Harvey (1966) to be associated with 
greater intolerance of ambiguity and more concrete conceptual function-
ing. 
A second type of factor which may influence performance on the 
DIT is the subject's risk-taking preferences (viz., Goldman, Note 1). 
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There is evidence that several of the variables discussed so far may 
have similar relationships to the risk-taking variable. For example, 
Higgins (Note 7) found that cognitive complexity was significantly 
correlated with moderate probability preferences (E = .70) and lower 
confidence ratings about these probability judgments (~ = .57). Fur-
thermore, probability preferences and confidence ratings were not sig-
nificantly correlated. There is some evidence that people with an in-
ternal LOC perform better than externals under conditions of skill, 
and externals perform better than internals under chance conditions; 
however, the evidence is inconclusive (Joe, 1971). Finally, Kogan and 
Wallach (1964) found evidence of a significant relationship between 
Witkin's Embedded Figures Test and their Choice Dilemmas instrument 
which measures risk-taking preferences. The Choice Dilemmas measure 
was also found to have predictive value for a gambling situation in 
which the subjects' choices had monetary consequences. (P. 39) 
The third source of potential influence on a subject's DIT per-
formance was the characteristic manner in which he resolved inter- and 
intra-personal conflicts. Rest et al. (1974) defined a moral judgment 
stage as "a conceptual framework for interpreting social interrelation-
ships and mutual responsibilities." (P. 492) The role of defense 
mechanisms is to protect the individual's self-concept from external 
threats, e.g., devaluating experiences, and internal threats, such as 
guilt provoking thoughts or actions. Coleman (1972) listed three ways 
by which defense mechanisms may protect the self: First, "by denying, 
distorting, or restricting the individual's experience." Second, "by 
reducing emotional or self-involvement." Third, "by counteracting 
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threat or damage." (P. 126) There would seem to be at least face 
validity to the proposition that if an individual's self-concept were 
threatened by experiences proceeding from his social relationships and 
responsibilities~ defense mechanisms would alter his view of these re-
lationships in order to reduce the threat. Kohlberg (1976) touches on 
this issue~ somewhat indirectly~ in his discussion of the relationship 
between ego development and moral development. He acknowledged that an 
individual's moral stage must be understood within the broader context 
of his ego development. However~ he cautioned against subsuming moral 
development under ego development because many of the special problems 
and features of moral development would be lost. 
A survey of the cognitive developmental literature did not pro-
duce any studies directly exploring the relationship between level of 
moral judgment and various intrapsychic defense mechanisms. However, 
some research has been conducted into the relationship between defense 
mechanisms and two variables which may influence moral judgment pro-
cesses~ i.e., field articulation and LOC. Witkin et al. (1962) found 
that analytical functioning was associated with a well developed defen-
sive structure. Using the Thematic Apperception Test to measure defenses, 
Witkin et al. found complex defenses (e.g., isolation and intellectual-
ization) as opposed to simpler defenses (e.g.~ denial and repression) to 
be associated with analytical functioning. The Defense Mechanism In-
ventory (Gieser & Ihilevich, 1969) has been used in a series of studies 
investigating the relationship between Witkin's construct and psycholog-
ical defenses. Field independent subjects used intellectualized de-
fenses significantly more than field dependents and the latter used 
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denial and repression more than the field independents (Bogo, Winget, 
& Gieser, 1970). Ihilevich and Gleser (1971) found that field depen-
dents relied excessively on defenses involving turning against self, 
denial, and repression. Field independents tended to use defenses in-
volving projection. The subjects for this study were outpatients at 
a mental health clinic, none of whom were on medication or had diag-
noses of organicity or psychosis. Similar results were obtained by 
Donovan, Hague, and O'Leary (1975) using a population of detoxified 
male, veteran, alcoholic inpatients. The sample excluded those with 
diagnoses of organicity or psychosis. O'Leary, Donovan, and Kasner 
(1975) found that after 4~ weeks of inpatient treatment, the post test 
scores of alcoholics increased in the direction of greater field inde-
pendence while at the same time their use of denial and repression, as 
measured by the Defense Mechanisms Inventory (DMI) decreased. 
Some research has been conducted with the DMI and measures of 
LOC. O'Leary, Donovan, and Hague (1975) found that internals, as 
measured by Rotter's scale, used defenses such as denial, repression, 
isolation, and intellectualization to a greater extent than externals. 
Externals used defenses which involved turning against the threatening 
object, i.e., displacement, to a greater degree than internals. Kendall, 
Finch, and Montgomery (Note 8), using the Nowicki-Strickland Internal-
External Scale, found very similar relationships between LOC orientation 
and DMI defense categories as did O'Leary et al. (1975). Inasmuch as 
Goldman (Note 1) found internality to be significantly associated with 
post-conventional moral thinking, the relationship between defense 
mechanisms and level of moral judgment warrants investigation. 
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To summarize, recent progress in theories of moral development 
suggests that motivational constructs may play an important role in 
producing a comprehensive theory of moral development. Rotter's LOC 
construct has been shown to merit consideration when conducting research 
in this field, although the motivational component of this construct 
needs clarification. Analysis of the Defining Issues Test of moral 
reasoning suggests that the ability to make cognitive disciminations, 
risk-taking preferences, and modes of resolving inter- and intra-per-
sonal conflicts may influence performance on the test, apart from the 
subject's moral developmental stage. In clarifying this set of issues, 
the nature of the LOC construct may also gain illumination. The under-
lying assumptions of this study are these: Firs4 LOC is a useful con-
struct for the conceptualization of moral development. Second, the 
process of making moral judgments, as measured by the DIT, involves 
perceptual, cognitive, and personality factors. Accordingly, the basic 
hypotheses of this study are these: 
1. Post-conventional stages of moral reasoning (P) are positively 
associated with an internal LOC. 
la. A corollary hypothesis, proc~eding from the two assumptions 
listed above, is that there is a common factor underlying the influence 
of the LOC, perceptual, cognitive, and personality factors on moral 
reasoning. 
The following group of basic hypotheses deal more specifically lvith the 
potential influences on a subject's DIT performance: 
2. Field independent (FI) subjects, having a more differentiated 
mode of perceptual functioning, will score higher on the DIT than field 
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dependent (FD) subjects, thereby indicating a more sophisticated level 
of moral reasoning. 
3. Subjects who are more cognitively efficient will use higher 
levels of moral reasoning more frequently than the less cognitively 
efficient. 
4. Subjects whose characteristic usage of defense mechanisms 
differs will also differ significantly in their DIT scores. Assuming 
that the LOC construct is relevant to a subject's employment of psycho-
logical defenses and that LOC has the same functional relationship to 
defense mechanisms as it does to post-conventional moral reasoning, it 
is specifically hypothesized that subjects whose REV or PRN scores are 
at least one SD above the group mean will have a significantly higher P 
score than subjects whose TAO scores are at least one SD above the 
group mean. Subjects in the PRN category use isolation, intellectuali-
zation, and rationalization while those in the REV category use repress-
ion and denial. The TAO category includes subjects who tend to resolve 
conflict by attacking the external frustrating object. 
4a. It is conceivable that if a subject'susageof defense mechan-
isms influences his moral reasoning, it will also influence the actual 
decisions made in reasoning about a moral dilemma. A corollary hypoth-
esis is, therefore, that characteristic usage of defense mechanisms will 
influence the nature of decisions made on the DIT. Specifically, subjects 
who fall in the TAO category will advocate decisions involving legal 
violations significantly more than subjects who are in the PRN or REV 
categories. 
The next set of hypotheses seek to replicate and extend the 
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previous findings of Goldman (Note 1) that the actual decisions made on 
the DIT provide important data for understanding moral judgment processes. 
Sa. Men are more likely than women to advocate violation of legal 
norms in their decisions on the DIT. 
Sb. Subjects who differ significantly in their advocacy of legal 
violations will also differ significantly in their risk-taking prefer-
ences, as measured by the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas. 
Sc. These same subjects will also differ significantly in their 
sensitivity to situational factors influencing the probability of 
illegal behavior, as measured by the Behavior Prediction Scale. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were obtained from the Loyola University Psychology 
Department subject pool. Participation in the investigation partially 
fulfilled requirements for the introductory psychology course. A 
total of 60 people participated (32 males and 28 females). Average 
age for the sample was 18.6 years {males= 18.8, females= 18.2). 
Instruments 
A battery of nine tests and questionnaires was administered: 
1. Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (LOC) (Rotter, 1966); 
2. Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation Inventory (ROI) 
(Allport & Ross, 1967); 
3. Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest et al., 1974); 
4. Behavior Prediction Scale (BPS) (Rettig & Rawson, 1963); 
5. Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (OLMAT) (Otis & Lennon, 1963); 
6. Choice Dilemmas (CD) (Kogan & Wallach, 1964); 
7. Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) (Oltman, Raskin, & Witkin, 
1971); 
8. Defense Mechanisms Inventory (DMI) (Gieser & Ihilevich, 1969); 
9. Rimoldi Thought Problems (RTP) (Rimoldi et al., Note 2). 
The less well known tests are described below. The Choice 
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Dilemmas is a 12 item questionnaire which presents a hypothetical 
person faced with an important decision to make. This person must 
choose between taking a risky action with the potential for great per-
sonal benefit or maintain the status quo with its more limited bene-
fits and risks. The subject must indicate what is the minimal proba-
bility of success which would permit him to advise the hypothetical 
person to take the risk. The probability choices given the subject 
are 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90% probability of success as well as the 
option of advising never to take the contemplated action. This latter 
option is scored as a 100% probability of success. 
The CD was conceptualized by Kogan and Wallach (1964) as a meas-
ure of the deterrence of failure, i.e., when the probability of success 
for the risky alternative was so high that it offset the concomitant 
risk of failure. Higher scores on the CD reflect greater conservatism 
in risk-taking behavior; lower scores indicate greater willingness to 
take risks. 
The Group Embedded Figures Test is an adaptation of the individ-
ually administered Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, 1950). The GEFT 
contains 18 complex geometric figures which are hidden in larger geo-
metric designs. Seventeen of the test items are taken directly from 
the original test. The subject receives one point for each correctly 
identified figure, so scores may range from 0-18. 
Oltman et al. (1971) found that men performed slightly, but 
significantly, better than women which is consistent with findings 
usually obtained with the EFT (Witkin et al., 1962). Correlations 
between the GEFT and EFT of .63 for females and .82 for males were 
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reported. Correlations between the GEFT and the criteria! measures 
for the EFT ranging from .34 to .71 were also reported. These corre-
lations are fairly comparable to the correlations obtained between 
the EFT and these same measures. 
The Defense Mechanisms Inventory is a paper-and-pencil objective 
instrument. A subject's characteristic and differential use of five 
classes of defenses is measured across five areas of conflict: author-
ity, independence, competition, situational, and masculinity or femin-
inity. There are two stories per area for a total of ten. After each 
story the subject must choose the two responses which are most and 
least representative of his own proposed actual behavior, fantasied 
behavior, thoughts, and feelings, were he to actually have the exper-
ience described in the story. For each of these four aspects of 
responding--proposed actual behavior, fantasied behavior, thoughts, 
and feelings--there are five statements, each statement exemplifying 
one class of defenses. The five classes of defenses are as follows: 
1) Turning Against Object (TAO), 2) Projection (PRO), 3) Principali-
zation (PRN), 4) Turning Against Self (TAS), and 5) Reversal (REV). 
The first class, TAO, includes those behaviors which resolve conflict 
through attacks against the external frustrating object. Projection 
involves the justification of aggression against an external object 
through the unfounded attribution of negative characteristics to an 
external object. The PRN class incorporates such defenses as isolation, 
intellectualization, and rationalization. The TAS class directs inward 
the aggressive responses evoked by the conflict. Finally, REV includes 
repression and denial which attempt resolution of conflict by inhibiting 
negative responses. 
Regarding scoring, the response chosen as most representative 
in each set of five responses is given a weight of two. The least 
representative response is weighted zero. The remaining three items 
each have a value of one. Potential scores for a given class of de-
fenses may range from 0-80. However, the sum of the scores for the 
five types must equal 200. That is, ten stories times four response 
modes times (three items valued at one plus one item valued at two) 
equals two hundred. 
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Gleser and Ihilevich (1969) reported reliability coefficients 
ranging from .85 to .93 for a one week interval and coefficients 
ranging from .69 to .87 for a three month interval. Weissman, Ritter, 
and Gordon (1971) reported reliability coefficients for a 17 day in-
terval ranging from .61 to .84 for their total sample. They found 
that male DMI scores are less stable than females. The findings of 
Weissman et al. (1971) confirmed those of Gleser and Ihilevich (1969) 
that men score significantly higher than women on TAO and PRO and 
significantly lower on TAS. 
Gleser and Ihilevich (1969) presented a variety of findings in 
support of the construct validity of the DMI. In a review for the 
Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook, Walsh (1972) characterized this 
data as "conflicting and, at best, partially confirmatory." He con-
cluded, however, that despite several problems, the DMI rated well as 
a research measure, particularly in comparison with other measures of 
defense mechanisms of similar scope. 
The Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test is an 80 item, group-
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administered test of general intellectual ability. There are various 
levels for different grade levels as well as alternative forms for 
each level. There are no versions of the test designed specifically 
for college level populations. The Advanced Level, Form J version 
was used in this research. Norms, reliability, and validity data are 
not available for use of the test with a college population. However, 
it should be noted that the average age of the research sample is 
less than 12 months older than the sample upon which standardization 
data is available. Consultation with the test consultant for the test 
publisher produced the following suggestion: Inasmuch as the concern 
of the present research is with the final mental ability level rather 
than with the rate of growth, a raw score could be used for subsequent 
statistical analyses, rather than a deviation IQ (Mitchell, Note 9). 
Consequently, the OLMAT scores reported herein will represent the raw 
total of questions correctly answered, without corrections for guess-
ing. 
Otis and Lennon (1963) reported an alternate-form reliability 
coefficient of .94 for the version of the test used in this research. 
Their subjects were 766 high school seniors. They also reported a 
reliability coefficient of .94 for a sample of 130 tenth graders re-
tested in eleventh grade. A great deal of evidence for the content 
and construct validity of the test is presented in their technical 
handbook (Otis & Lennon, 1963). 
The Rimoldi method for exploring the relationship between logical 
structure, language, and thinking was described in the first chapter. 
The development of this method and its scoring system is too complex 
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to be succinctly described here. The interested reader is referred 
to the works of Rimoldi and his colleagues cited previously. Suffice 
it to say that four problems were given to each subject (Problems 31A, 
31B, 35A, and 35B). Type 31 problems have a simple logical structure; 
Type 35, a more complicated one. Type A problems use concrete lan-
guage; Type B, abstract language. Scores for Problem 31A may range 
from 0-0.5; for Problem 31 B, from 0-0.0625; for Problems 35A and 35B, 
from 0-0.0235. The subject's scores for the four problems are aver-
· aged to yield an Average Cognitive Efficiency (ACE) score. Of the 
three scoring systems developed, the Schema Pulling Out method was 
used. There is some evidence that this method is the best discrimin-
ator between good and poor problem solvers (Erdmann, Note 5). Minor 
revisions were incorporated into the scoring system, after consultation 
with Erdmann (Note 10), which were consistent with Rimoldi's theoret-
ical rationale. 
In addition to an objective analysis of the efficiency of the 
subject's problem solving processes, one can look at whether or not 
the subject solved the problems correctly. Rimoldi et al. (Note 2) 
found that cognitive efficiency was not clearly related to the number 
of correct solutions. Thus, it is quite possible for one subject to 
ask the minimal number of appropriate questions necessary to solve the 
problem, but yet get the wrong answer, while another subject may obtain 
the correct answer despite asking several irrelevant and redundant 
questions. In this example, the former subject would receive a higher 
ACE score, despite the wrong answer, because the manner (tactic) in 
which he arrived at his solution adhered more closely to the logical 
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structure of the problem than did the tactic of the latter subject. 
Finally, it should be noted that the name "Rimoldi Thought 
Problems" is a convention adopted by the present writer. This writer 
did not find a formal designation for the Rimoldi method in the numer-
ous publications of Rimoldi which were consulted. 
Scoring methods for the other tests are as follows. The Rotter 
LOC Scale score is the sum of answers indicating an internal orienta-
tion (highest possible score equals 23). This was done so that if any 
positive correlation were to be found between this scale and other 
scales, the relationship would be expressed in positive, rather than 
negative, numbers. 
In his 1966 monograph, Rotter reported test-retest reliability 
coefficients ranging from .49 to .83 for one and two month periods. 
Joe (1971) concluded from his literature review that evidence for 
Rotter's LOC construct although not entirely favorable is generally 
supportive of the construct's validity. 
The Intrinsic and Extrinsic scales of the Religious Orientation 
Inventory are both scored so that higher scores indicate a more exter-
nal attitude on each scale. Scores on the scales can range from 9-45 
and 12-60, respectively. These scale scores are not combined because 
they measure two separate dimensions. The ROI is able to identify 
three types of individuals. The intrinsic type tends to agree with 
items on the Intrinsic Scale and disagree with those on the Extrinsic. 
The converse is true for the extrinsic individual. The indiscriminate-
ly pro-religious (INPR) person tends to agree with anything that sounds 
favorable to religion. Therefore, he tends to agree with items on 
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both scales. Allport and Ross (1967) classified as this type any sub-
ject scoring at least 12 points less on the intrinsic scale than on 
the extrinsic scale. 
Answers to the Defining Issues Test are classified according to 
their stage of moral reasoning and weighted according to the impor-
tance the subject attributes to it in making his decision. Scores for 
each level of moral reasoning reflect the frequency with which the 
subject uses each level of reasoning. Rest (1974) recommended that 
a P, or Principled Morality, score rather than individual stage scores 
be used for statistical analysis. The P score is the sum of stage 
scores for the three highest stages of moral reasoning. It is inter-
preted as "the relative importance a subject gives to principled moral 
considerations in making a decision about moral dilemmas." (Rest, 1974, 
p. 4-3) 
A correlation of .68 with Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview is 
provided as evidence for the construct validity of the DIT as do the 
correlations with other tests (Rest, et al., 1974). Two year reliabil-
ity coefficients of .68 for 16-17 year olds and .54 for 18-20 year olds 
were reported (Rest, 1975). 
The Behavior Prediction Scale measures the influence of four 
variables--Expectancy of Gain, Reinforcement Value of Gain, Expectancy 
of Censure, and Reinforcement Value of Censure--on a subject in making 
behavioral predictions. Each variable is measured under high and low 
conditions. The degree of sensitivity to a change in conditions is the 
magnitude of the difference in prediction scores for each condition. 
Scoring for each item ranges from 0 (story character will definitely 
not steal) to 6 (will definitely steal). Potential range of scores 
for each condition is 0-48. 
Procedure 
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The average time necessary to complete the test battery was es-
timated at five hours. Inasmuch as the data was to be collected toward 
the end of the semester, tests which were timed, required factual 
answers, or had difficult instructions were group administered under 
the supervision of the experimenter on two separate occasions before 
and after a school vacation period. With other tests requiring only 
individual opinions or self-descriptions, subjects were given the op-
tion of completing the tests at home. The period in which the data 
were collected ranged in length from 1-3~ weeks. All subjects com-
pleted the OLMAT, GEFT, and RTP under supervision. Many subjects com-
pleted several of the other tests under supervision and the few remain-
ing at home. Subjects choosing to take tests home were given a printed 
list of instructions, describing the conditions by which to take the 
tests. For example, eliminate distractions such as television. Do 
not consult other people since there are no right or wrong answers. 
Do each test in one sitting and space the taking of the tests as close 
as possible. 
The order of administration was as follows: The GEFT was given 
first because it was a timed test. The RTP followed because of its 
complicated instructions. Subjects who had sufficient time left in the 
scheduled group administration then did the DIT. The OLMAT, a timed 
test, was administered at the post-vacation testing session because 
of a delay in its delivery. The remaining tests were taken at home 
and are assumed to have been taken in a random order. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Previous research by Goldman (Note 1) confirmed findings by All-
port and Ross (1967) that indiscriminately pro-religious (INPR) sub-
jects tend to obscure trends in data involving the ROI. To assess the 
potential influence of this factor on our results, subjects were class-
ified into two groups according to Allport and Ross' criteria. At 
test indicated that INPR subjects scored significantly lower on the DIT 
P score than non-INPR subjects (~ = 1.93, df =58,~ <.03). In other 
words, INPR subjects were less likely to use post-conventional forms 
of moral reasoning. Because of the importance of DIT data in the sta-
tistical analysis of the hypotheses, the results reported herein are 
restricted to the 42 non-INPR subjects. 
Table 1 lists the mean scores and standard deviations obtained 
by the non-INPR subsample on the test battery. 
The first hypothesis was confirmed by computing a Pearson corre-
lation between the DIT P and LOC scores (r = .28, N = 42, ~ <.05). 
The validity of corollary hypothesis la was tested by performing 
a principal factors factor analysis on the test battery. An orthogonal 
factor matrix, after a varimax rotation, is given in Table 2. An 
examination of the factor structure yields three relevant observations. 
First, the DMI subscales received their highest loadings on Factors 
One and Three. Second, the moral reasoning measure (P) has identical 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Subjects 
Who Are Not Indiscriminately Pro-Religious 
Variable 
Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (OLMAT) 
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) 
Average Cognitive Efficiency (ACE) 
Extrinsic Religious Orientation (EXROI) 
Intrinsic Religious Orientation (INROI) 
Internal Locus of Control (INLOC) 
Defense Mechanisms Inventory-Principalization (DMIPRN) 
Defense Mechanisms Inventory-Turning Against Self 
(DMITAS) 
Defense Mechanisms Inventory-Reversal (DMIREV) 
Defense Mechanisms Inventory-Turning Against Object 
(DMITAO) 
Defense Mechanisms Inventory-Projection (DMIPRO) 
Defining Issues Test-P Score (P) 
Choice Dilemmas (CD) 
Expectancy of Gain Difference Score (EGND) 
Reinforcement Value of Gain Score (RVGND) 
Expectancy of Censure Score (ECSD) 
Reinforcement Value of Censure Score (RVCSD) 
Defining Issues Test-Decisions (DIT Decisions) 
(B_=42) 
M 
65.62 
13.40 
.03 
31.33 
25.95 
12.24 
43.93 
38.55 
35.81 
42.12 
39.64 
24.62 
5.67 
7.00 
10.90 
-6.48 
-9.00 
2.10 
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SD 
7.70 
4.91 
.01 
4.70 
3.50 
4.30 
6.46 
7.70 
6. 72 
7.65 
5.09 
8.11 
1.34 
6.12 
9.75 
6.02 
6.01 
1.12 
Variable 
DMPROTAO* 
EXROI 
DMIREV 
OLMAT 
GEFT 
ACE 
INROI 
p 
DIT Decisions 
RVGND 
INLOC 
ECSD 
RVCSD 
DMIPRN 
DMITAS 
RVGND 
CD 
EGND 
Table 2 
Orthogonal Factor Matrix After Varimax Rotation 
Factor 
1 
.94 
.44 
-. 77 
.19 
-.01 
-.03 
.27 
.03 
.17 
.07 
-.08 
-.10 
.10 
-.41 
-.17 
.07 
.03 
-.02 
Factor 
2 
-.01 
.14 
-.16 
.79 
.64 
.51 
.39 
.32 
.30 
.27 
.04 
.06 
-.02 
.11 
.07 
.27 
-.03 
-.18 
Factor 
3 
-.05 
.17 
.21 
.14 
-.01 
-.03 
.37 
.32 
.15 
-.02 
.49 
.73 
.71 
-.04 
-.09 
-.02 
. 05 
-.15 
Factor 
4 
-.11 
.12 
.20 
.12 
-.06 
.04 
.34 
-.16 
-.02 
.01 
.20 
-.07 
-.06 
.82 
-.74 
.01 
-.01 
-.01 
*DMPROTAO is a variable created by averaging the subject's score on 
the DMITAO and DMIPRO subscales. There are two reasons for making 
this substitution in the factor analysis. First, one of the short-
comings of the DMI is that the DMITAO and DMIPRO subscales are not 
adequately differentiated (Walsh, 1972). Second, it is not possible 
to do a principal factors analysis when 1 measure is completely de-
termined by 1 or more other measures. The nature of the DMI scoring 
procedures is such that any 4 of the subscale scores together com-
pletely determine the score on the remaining scale. 
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loadings on Factors Two and Three. Finally, the second factor is 
comprised mainly of tests measuring intelligence, field articulation, 
cognitive efficiency, and intrinsic religious motivation while the 
third factor has LOC and two measures of sensitivity to risk loading 
highest on it. Taken together, these three observations indicate that 
psychodynamic defense mechanisms .do not appear to operate on the 
process of moral reasoning. Also, the analysis indicates that the 
perceptual and cognitive factors operating in moral reasoning processes 
are distinct from the LOC construct, but that LOC may mediate between 
the cognitive and situational factors contributing to moral reasoning. 
These findings thus are inconsistent with the hypothesis of a unitary 
factor underlying all constructs contributing to moral reasoning. 
The second hypothesis, that field independents will score higher 
on the DIT, was tested by means of a~ test. Witkin et al. (1962) 
, 
reported that males scored significantly higher on measures of field 
independence. Inasmuch as the sex differences in the present sample 
on the GEFT approached significance (~ = 1.50, df = 40, E <.07), the 
subsample was divided a~cording to sex. Subjects were classified as 
field independent if their GEFT scores fell at least one SD above the 
mean. Subjects whose score was at least one SD below the mean were 
placed in the field dependent group. On the surface the results in-
dicate that field articulation is not a significant explanatory factor 
for males (~ = .90, df = 4, E >.05), but is significant for females 
(~ = 2.61, df = 5, E <.03), when analyzing their DIT performance. 
To test the third hypothesis, a· one-way ANOVA was performed con-
trasting subjects whose cognitive efficiency scores (ACE) fell at least 
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one SD above versus one SD below the mean. The results, indicated in 
Table 3, do not support the hypothesis of cognitive efficiency in-
fluencing moral reasoning processes on the DIT. 
The results for Hypothesis 4 are given in Table 4. Contrary to 
expectation, differences in characteristic usage of defense mechanisms 
did not produce any significant difference in DIT performance. In order 
to test the remaining hypotheses it was first necessary to examine the 
DIT protocols for the specific decisions made. The following decisions 
were considered by the investigator to involve a violation of law: 
Heinz--the drug should be stolen; Student Takeover--the sit-in should 
take place; Escaped Prisoner--the prisoner should not be reported to 
the police; Doctor--the doctor should perform euthanasia; Webster--
the minority applicant should not be hired; Newspaper--the principal 
should revoke permission to publish the student paper. Each subject's 
decisions were compared to the criteria! answers and a frequency count 
of instances of agreement was made. The score was termed "DIT Deci-
sions". Scores could range from 0 to 6, with 6 signifying that all 
decisions involved legal violations. 
Corollary Hypothesis 4a, predicting a significant effect of de-
fense mechanisms on moral decisions (DIT Decisions) was tested by an 
ANOVA with selected a priori contrasts. The results, given in Table 5, 
partially support the hypothesis. Subjects who externalize their 
frustration endorse decisions involving legal violations significantly 
more than those who intellectualize (~ = 2.20, df = 21, E <.04). There 
were no significant differences in advocacy of legal violations between 
those who tend to repress feelings and those who tend to externalize 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance of Moral Reasoning by Cognitive Efficiency 
Source DF ss MS F 
Between 1 44.04 44.04 .48 
Within 10 924.63 92.46 
Total 11 968.67 
39 
Table 4 
Analysis of Variance of Moral Reasoning 
by Defense Mechanisms, With Selected Contrasts 
Source DF ss MS F 
Between 4 219.62 54.90 .74 
Within 21 1552.23 73.92 
Total 25 1771.85 
Contrast Value Stand Error df p 
DMIPRN vs DMITAO 3.52 4.45 .79 21 
DMIREV vs DMITAO 6.14 6.89 .89 21 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance of Moral Decisions 
by Defense Mechanisms, Hith Selected Contrasts 
Source DF ss MS F 
Between 4 8.11 2.03 1. 78 
Within 21 23.93 1.14 
Total 25 32.04 
Contrast Value Stand Error t df p 
DMIPRN vs. DMITAO 
-1.21 .55 
-2.20 21 .04 
DMIREV vs. DMITAO 
-.21 .86 -.25 21 
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their feelings. 
The existence of sex differences in the advocacy of legal vio-
lations, Hypothesis Sa, was confirmed. DIT Decision scores for males 
were significantly higher than females' scores (~ = 4.68, df = 40, 
E <.001). 
Hypothesis Sb, that subjects differing significantly in their 
advocacy of legal violations will also differ significantly in their 
risk-taking preferences was tested by means of a 2X2 ANOVA with scores 
on the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas as the dependent variable. The 
results, given in Table 6, indicate a significant main effect for DIT 
Decisions (F = 7.46; df = 1,28; E <.01). The main effect of Sex and 
the interaction effect were non-significant. 
Hypothesis Sc predicted that level of DIT Decisions will deter-
mine performance on the Behavior Prediction Scale subscales. That is, 
those who advocate legal violations on the DIT will also be more sen-
sitive to situational differences affecting the probability of illegal 
behavior. Inasmuch as significant sex differences existed on DIT 
Decisions scores, sex was included as an independent variable in a 
2X2X4 multivariate ANOVA. Interestingly, Table 7 shows a significant 
main effect for sex (F = 3.85; df = 4,25; E <.01), but non-significant 
effects for DIT Decisions and the interaction of the main effects. 
A summary of univariate F tests of the sex factor's influence 
on the dependent measures, given in Table 8, shows that the main 
effect of this factor is attributable to significant sex differences 
on the Expectancy of Gain and Reinforcement Value of Censure subscales 
(f = 10.82; if= 1,25; E <.003 and F = 6.57; df = 1,25; E <.02, 
Table 6 
A 2X2 Analysis of Variance of Risk-Taking Preferences 
by Sex and Moral Decisions, With Unequal N 
Source DF ss MS F Sig 
Main Effects 2 12.02 6.01 3.89 .03 
Sex 1 3.92 3.92 2.54 .12 
DIT Decisions 1 11.54 11.54 7.46 .01 
Interaction 
Sex by DIT Decisions 1 2.66 2.66 1.72 
Residual 28 43.29 1.55 
Total 31 57.97 1.87 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Behavior 
Prediction Scale Scores by Sex and Moral Decisions 
Source df F p* 
Sex 4 3.85 .01 
DIT Decisions 4 1.33 
Interaction 4 .22 
Error 25 
*using Wilk's lambda criterion 
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Table 8 
Univariate F Tests of the Sex Effect 
on Behavior Prediction Scale Scores 
Independent Variable: Sex 
.Dependent Variable df MS F p 
EGND 1 368.05 10.82 .003 
RVGND 1 211.91 2.04 
ECSD 1 61.95 1.64 
RVCSD 1 247.46 6.57 .02 
ERROR 25 
respectively). Tables 9 and 10 give summaries of univariate F tests 
for the DIT Decisions and interaction effects, respectively. With 
one exception on Table 9, Expectancy of Censure, these tests are all 
non-significant. 
45 
46 
Table 9 
Univariate F Tests of the Effect 
of Moral Decisions on Behavior Prediction Scale Scores 
Independent Variable: DIT Decisions 
Dependent Variable df MS F p 
EGND 1 3.12 . 09 
RVGND 1 .09 .001 
ECSD 1 150.14 3.98 .06 
RVCSD 1 3.05 .08 
ERROR 25 
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Table 10 
Univariate F Tests of the Effect of the Sex-Moral 
Decision Interaction on Behavior Prediction Scale Scores 
Independent Variable: Sex by DIT Decisions Interaction 
Dependent Variable df MS F p 
EGND 1 15.57 .46 
RVGND 1 26.02 .25 
ECSD 1 • 83 .02 
RVCSD 1 5.02 .13 
ERROR 25 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The result of correlating the LOC scale with the DIT supported 
the hypothesis that an internal LOC is associated with post-convention-
al forms of moral reasoning and, conversely, that an external LOC is 
associated with lower levels. This finding replicates that of Goldman 
(Note 1) and together they contradict Arbuthnot's (1973) finding of a 
non-significant correlation between the measures. 
Corollary hypothesis la assumed that, if perceptual, cognitive, 
and personality factors as well as LOC orientation influenced the 
moral reasoning process, there was likely to be a common factor under-
lying these variables. The results of the factor analysis did not 
support this assumption. In retrospect, it appears to have been a 
simplistic expectation that such a diverse aggregation of variables 
would have a common underlying factor, even if they all acted upon one 
measure. Two factors emerge from the test battery which do appear to 
influence moral reasoning processes: A cognitive-intellectual factor 
and a LOC factor (see Factors Two and Three in Table 2). The finding 
of a cognitive-intellectual factor is consistent with Rest's (1974) 
finding of a significant, moderate correlation of DIT performance and 
intelligence. The LOC factor is supportive of recent attempts, e.g., 
Dienstbier et al. (1975), to integrate cognitive-developmental and 
learning theories of moral development~ The significance of this LOC 
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factor will be discussed in greater detail in connection with other 
hypotheses. Finally, the factor analysis indicates that usage of 
defense mechanisms does not influence the reasoning process. 
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The next three hypotheses proceeded from a logical analysis of 
the task demands of the DIT. This analysis suggested that, rather 
than being a pure measure of moral reasoning, the DIT might also re-
flect the influence of non-moral abilities and characteristics of the 
subject. A survey of the literature suggested three variables which 
might influence performance on the DIT apart from one's stage of moral 
reasoning. Thus, to the extent that these following hypotheses are 
confirmed, they call into question the construct validity of the DIT 
as a test of moral reasoning; to the extent they are disconfirmed, 
its construct validity is unchallenged. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive association between degree of 
differentiated perceptual functioning and level of moral reasoning. 
Field articulation had a significant effect on females' DIT performance, 
but not on males'. It seems likely that there was a ceiling effect 
on the GEFT which restricted its discrimination among males. Evidence 
for such an effect is this: Consistent with the findings of Witkin et 
al. (1962) there is a trend in our data from males to score higher 
than females (~ = 1.50, df = 40, £ <.07). Moreover, with the higher 
mean (14.38 vs. 12.11) males had much less variation in their scores 
than ·females (SD = 3.66 vs. 6.08). Inasmuch as the GEFT is an eighteen 
point test, all scores for both sexes are encompassed within one SD 
above the respective means. Thus the greater variability among the 
females provided the GEFT with greater discriminatory power for them 
50 
in the t test involving GEFT and DIT. 
In view of the limited number of subjects used in these analyses 
(N = 6 for males; N = 7 for females), these findings should be viewed 
tentatively in evaluating the hypothesis. These findings leave open 
the possibility that the perceptual ability to identify a simple geo-
metric figure embedded in a complex figure may be related to the abil-
ity to identify a familiar form of moral reasoning out of a list of 
ten statements employing up to seven different forms of reasoning. 
Because of its implications for evaluation of DIT performance the re-
lationship between field articulation and the DIT warrants further 
research. 
The hypothesized relationship between cognitive efficiency and 
level of moral reasoning was not confirmed. The Rimoldi Thought 
Problems were a relatively close parallel to Rest's speculation about 
how the subject approaches the DIT. It had been thought likely that 
the ability to identify the logical structure of a thought problem and 
then identify a statement corresponding to a particular point in that 
logical structure would be related to a task which requires the iden~ 
tification of the salient issues in a moral dilemma and then the iden-
tification of an issue statement which deals with that issue. Other 
researchers have found a relationship between cognitive efficiency and 
an internal LOC (Ludwigsen, 1972; Phares, 1968). In the present re-
search such a relationship did not exist (~ = .09, N = 42, ~ >.05). 
This may account for the lack of association between cognitive effic-
iency and P in the present study. 
These negative findings are somewhat counter-balanced by the 
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evidence suggesting that field articulation may influence DIT perfor-
mance and the parallel between the task demands of the GEFT and the 
Rimoldi paradigm. A post hoc partial correlation analysis of the 
field independence-cognitive efficiency relationship was performed. 
The results indicate a significant partial correlation between field 
independence and cognitive efficiency after the effects of intelligence 
were controlled. This held true for males (partial£= .49, N = 21, 
£ <.009), but not for females (partial~= -.09, N = 15, £ >.05). 
These findings provide partial support for Zigler's (1963) objection 
to Witkin's contention that verbal processes have little relevance to 
psychological differentiation. 
Taken together, the results for Hypotheses Two and Three leave 
open the original questions raised about the nature of the DIT task 
demands. 
The hypothesized relationship between level of moral reasoning 
and usage of defense mechanisms was not supported by the data, al-
though specific defense mechanisms were found to be differentially 
associated with DIT decisions advocating legal violations. One might 
account for this set of findings with a post hoc explanation that de-
fense mechanisms may influence the manner in which a subject is inclined 
to resolve a moral conflict without influencing the reasoning process 
by which he arrives at the resolution. This "explanation" is little 
more than a description of the results of testing Hypotheses 4 and 4a. 
Related data, given below, make the overall relationship between 
moral reasoning and moral decisions a very complicated one. A brief 
review of these findings will help delineate the problem's complexity: 
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1. Usage of post-conventional moral reasoning is positively 
associated with advocacy of legal violations (£ = .24, ~ = 42, ~ <.10). 
This, of course, supports the contenion that reasoning processes and 
decision outcomes on the DIT are related. 
2. An internal LOC is correlated with higher levels of reasoning 
(£ = .28, N = 42, E <.05). The relationship of LOC to other variables 
further complicates the picture: 
a. Defense mechanisms found previously (O'Leary et al., 1975) 
to be associated with different LOC orientations were found in the 
present study to differentiate successfully subjects advocating legal 
violations. That is, subjects who tend to externalize their anger ad-
vocate legal violations more frequently than subjects who tend to use 
rationalization. This finding is consistent with Williams and Van-
tress' (1969) investigation of the LOG's relationship to the Busse-
Durkee Hostility Inventory. Externality was correlated with hostility 
(r = .27, N = 235, ~ <.05). 
b. Similarly, male subjects who did not advocate legal vio-
lations tended to have an internal LOC (£ = -.29, ~ = 24, ~ <.08). 
Miller and Minton (1969) found similarly that externals violated ex-
perimental instructions more frequently than internals did, thereby 
suggesting that externals were more suspicious of the experimenter. 
Thus, LOC orientation is related in a theoretically consistent 
manner to post-conventional moral reasoning, decision outcomes on the 
DIT, and characteristic usage of defense mechanisms. Despite this 
pattern, the results obtained by Hypotheses 4 and 4a suggest that moral 
reasoning and moral decisions are not influenced by identical sets of 
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factors. That defense mechanisms do not influence moral reasoning 
processes supports the cognitive developmental view that cognitive, 
rather than affective or situational factors are primary in moral de-
velopment. However, to the extent that affective and situational 
factors influence moral decisions, the practical value of cognitive-
developmental theory in predicting moral behavior is limited. Kohl-
berg, of course, contended that the cognitive definition of a situation 
influences one's emotional reaction to it and that affective responses 
to moral conflicts develop in a parallel fashion to cognitive maturity 
(viz., 1969, p. 392). Thus, a Stage 3 subject experiences shame while 
a Stage 6 subject experiences guilt over moral transgressions. Al-
though cognitive maturity is the ultimate source of influence on moral 
decisions according to Kohlberg, he has not dealt extensively with the 
process linking reasoning to behavior, or affect to reasoning. 
Dienstbier et al. (1975) agreed with Kohlberg's suggestion that 
development of affective and cognitive maturity are parallel, although 
they were more inclined to explain emotional arousal in temptation 
situations by a learning, rather than a cognitive-developmental, model. 
Their emotion attribution theory attempts to link moral reasoning and 
emotions to moral behavior with this explanation: Emotional arousal 
in moral conflicts is primarily a function of learning. Maturity of 
moral reasoning may directly influence how this arousal is interpreted. 
More importantly, developmental-socializing experiences in the attri-
bution of the source of this emotional arousal--either inward to the 
subject or outward to external forces--will influence moral reasoning 
which in turn influences the interpretation of this arousal. 
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Supporting this attempt to integrate cognitive-developmental 
and learning theories of moral development are the findings of Ruma 
and Mosher (1967). Using Kohlberg's interview procedure and tests of 
guilt constructed on social learning theory, they found significant 
correlations ranging from .43 to .55 between level of moral judgment 
and three measures of internalized guilt. 
Putting aside these theoretical considerations, the network of 
empirical relationsh~ps described above remains to be explained. The 
data support the suggestion that LOC is a mediating variable between 
moral reasoning and moral decisions. It should be noted that although 
an internal LOC is positively correlated with post-conventional moral 
reasoning which is in turn positively associated with advocacy of legal 
violations, internal LOC is negatively correlated with advocacy of 
legal violations. This supports the suggestion that LOC is a multi-
faceted construct, including both cognitive and motivational components 
(cf. Midlarsky & Midlarsky, 1973; Phares, 1976; Rotter & Mulry, 1965). 
That is, the cognitive component may account for its associations with 
the DIT P score while its motivational component accounts for its 
association in a theoretically consistent fashion with DIT decisions 
and the defense mechanisms associated with those decisions. 
Additional support exists for the proposition that LOC has cog-
nitive and motivat~onal components allowing it to be a useful explana-
tory link between moral reasoning and decisions. Evidence supporting 
a strong relationship between attribution of intent and attribution of 
responsibility is reviewed by Maselli and Altrocchi (1969). It should 
be remembered at this point that the subject must determine in each DIT 
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dilemma the protagonist's responsibilities to different segments of 
society. Phares and Wilson (1972) demonstrated that internals not 
only accept more responsibility for their behavior than externals, but 
also attribute more responsibility to others. The relationships re-
ported above between LOC and defense mechanisms support the idea that 
LOC orientation is a factor in attribution processes. There is addi-
tional evidence in the present study which supports this assertion. 
Noting differences in socialization techniques, Dienstbier et 
al. (1975) suggested that an internally-orienting process may lead a 
child to associate his emotional arousal in a temptation situation to 
his own anticipated misconduct and subsequently the child will exper-
ience guilt. An externally-orienting process would lead to fear of 
punishment. Based on Dienstbier's position, Goldman (Note 1) suggested 
that the association between LOC and level of moral reasoning might be 
accounted for by the subject's attribution of responsibility for his 
experiences. In moral dilemmas an internal would be more likely to 
focus on his responsibilities for the ethical quality of his social 
relationships while an external is likely to be influenced more by 
external, environmental factors affecting the consequences of contem-
plated actions. Explicit in both Dienstbier's and Goldman's positions 
is the assertion that externals are more sensitive to situational 
factors likely to influence moral behavior. 
To test this, the sample was reduced to those subjects whose LOC 
scores were at least one SD from the mean. A ~ test was performed 
between each group's score on ECSD of the Behavior Prediction Scale. 
The ECSD score is obtained as follows: The subject's predictions of 
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the probability of an illegal act, in conditions involving high and 
low expectancy of getting caught, are compared by subtracting the Low 
condition score from the High condition score. If the resulting 
difference is negative, the subject feels that the probability of 
illegal action is more likely to occur under low conditions of detec-
tion. Furthermore, the larger the negative difference score, the more 
sensitive the subject is to the shift from high to low risk of detec-
tion. 
The results of the t test comparing internals and externals on 
their ECSD scores supported the positions of Dienstbier and Goldman 
(!_ = 1.79, df = 17, .E. <.05). This finding is consistent with that of 
Mosher (1965). He found in a perceptual defense experiment that sub-
jects with a more highly internalized sense of guilt were less in-
fluenced by variation in external situational cues affecting guilt 
than subjects with less internalized guilt. 
To summarize, the present research together with previous re-
search supports the idea that LOC has both cognitive and motivational 
components, that these components enable LOC to serve as a mediating 
variable between moral reasoning and moral decisions, and that the 
motivational component of LOC may be understood by an attibutional 
theory of emotions. 
The results of this study indicate that DIT decision data are 
significant in their own right and are systematically related to other 
variables. Goldman's (Note 1) finding that males advocate legal vio-
lations more frequently than females was replicated in this study. The 
results of the two studies are somewhat similar with regard to the 
r 
relationship of DIT Decisions to other variables. Goldman (Note 1) 
found for males, but not females, a significant correlation between 
advocacy of legal violations and higher levels of moral reasoning 
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(r = .47, N = 21, ~ <.03). In the present study significant trends 
were found for both males and females (~ = .31, N = 24, ~ <.07 and~ 
= .37, N = 18, ~ <.07, respectively). Thus, although males signifi-
cantly more than females advocated legal violations and although there 
were no significant sex differences on usage of post-conventional 
moral reasoning, advocacy of legal violations was positively assoc-
iated with higher levels of moral reasoning for both sexes. This is 
consistent with the lack of significant sex differences in risk prefer-
ences on the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas (~ = .93, df = 40, ~ >.05). 
It is conceivable that the DIT Decisions P correlation is attributable 
to the tendency of young adults to question traditions and the exist-
ing social order and its conventions. 
Goldman (Note 1) suggested that differences in sex roles might 
account for sex differences in advocacy of legal violations as solu-
tions to moral dilemmas. The results obtained for Hypotheses 5b and 
5c provide partial support for this explanation. A 2X2 ANOVA of risk-
taking preferences by Sex and DIT Decisions (see Table 6) revealed a 
significant effect for DIT Decisions, but not Sex. Given the signi-
ficance level (~ <.12) and limited number of subjects (32), it is like-
ly that with a larger sample the main effect of Sex would also be sig-
nificant. Should this result be obtained in a future replication it 
would support the idea that sex roles influence the risks one is will-
ing to take. For the moment, the present results establish a consistency 
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in subjects' willingness to take risks in situations involving moral-
istic-legalistic concerns and those situations which do not, but the 
effect of Sex on risk-taking is not directly established. 
A multivariate ANOVA of Hypothesis 5c (see Tables 7 and 8) demon-
strated that sex differences exist in subjects' sensitivity to changes 
in conditions facilitating the commission of illegal acts. Interest-
ingly, in this multivariate analysis, DIT Decisions does not generally 
influence performance on the BPS (see Table 9). However, indirectly 
these results support the concept of sex-role differences influencing 
DIT Decisions because they show that significant sex differences do 
exist in sensitivity to changes in potential gains and risks affecting 
the probability of illegal behavior. Although inconclusive, these 
findings warrant further exploration of the influence of sex-role iden-
tity on moral decisions involving an element of risk. In such research, 
specific measures of sex-role identification would be most helpful in 
clarifying this issue. 
SUNMARY 
A logical analysis of the task demands of the Defining Issues 
Test suggested that performance on this test might be influenced by 
factors other than maturity of moral reasoning. The results of this 
study leave unresolved whether or not field independence and cognitive 
efficiency influence performance on the test. There is sufficient 
evidence to warrant further investigation, however. Defense mechanisms 
clearly do not influence moral reasoning processes, although they do 
act upon the subject's tendency to endorse legal violations in re-
solving moral conflicts. 
The results of this study replicate and extend previous findings 
by Goldman (Note 1) regarding the positive relationship between inter-
nal LOC and post-conventional moral reasoning as well as the signifi-
cance of decision data provided by subjects on the Defining Issues Test. 
The present data support a conceptualization of the LOC construct as 
having cognitive and motivational components. The network of relation-
ships between LOC and other variables--moral reasoning 7 moral decisions, 
defense mechanisms, and sensitivity to situational factors affecting 
the probability of illegal behavior--is consistent with the research 
of Dienstbier et al. (1975). They employ attribution theory to expli-
cate the connection between moral reasoning processes and moral behav-
ior. 
In short, the results of this study raise new questions about 
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the perceptual and cognitive processes involved in moral reasoning and 
also support efforts of recent researchers in the field of moral de-
velopment to integrate cognitive-developmental and learning theories 
through social learning concepts. This study supports the utility of 
LOC as an explanatory construct, mediating the relationship between 
moral reasoning and moral decisions. 
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